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Should We Set the Market Free? 
Some Notes on International Economic Sanctions 
On the last week of May 2003, in a 14-0 vote, with Syria absent, the U.N. 
panel agreed to lift economic sanctions on Iraq. In the last days, Iran claimed 
for a softening of US sanctions in order to enhance the cooperation  on its 
nuclear projects. In the last years a big debate took place about sanctions, not 
only as regards Iraq, but also other famous cases as Cuba and Iran. But how 
much do we know about  international sanctions? This article is intended to 
deal with some aspects of this issue.  
First, sanctions appear to have been a common and recurring feature in 
political interactions between states. The United States, in particular, has been 
the major country imposing economic sanctions after World War II. No 
surprise at all, if we consider that the US applied economic sanctions even 
before becoming a state. In fact, in 1765 a boycott against British goods was 
imposed to protest the Parliament’s ratification of the Stamp act. In 1919, 
Woodrow Wilson declared: "A nation boycotted is a nation in sight of surrender. 
Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for 
force" (statement quoted by Hufbauer, 1999) Therefore, sanctions have been 
seen as a peaceful remedy to an ongoing conflict. In the last years, several 
sanctions imposed by a multilateral organisation like the United Nations have been used, and some of them are still in force. In fact, since the Berlin Wall fell 
down, sanctions have become a common instrument of the United Nations 
Security Council.  
 
WHAT ARE WE SPEAKING ABOUT? 
Scholars usually distinguish between negative and positive sanctions. 
Negative sanctions are the best-known economic instruments of diplomacy. 
They are imposed in order to inflict an economic damage to one or more 
countries. Otherwise, positive sanctions are measures devoted to foster co-
operation among some countries. For sake of simplicity, here I use the 
expression ‘economic sanctions’ to indicate roughly only negative sanctions. 
As it is common in the existing literature, by the expression ‘sender’ and 
‘target’ I denote respectively the country that imposes sanctions and the 
country that receives the economic punishment. It is possible to look at 
economic sanctions with respect to: (i) objective; (ii) actors involved; (iii) object 
of sanctions. 
As regards objectives of sanctions, following Barber (1979) it is possible to 
group them into three categories. There are ‘primary objectives’ concerned 
with the actions and behaviour of governments against whom the sanctions 
are directed. The ‘secondary objectives’ are related to status, behaviour and 
expectations of governments imposing sanctions. Finally the ‘tertiary 
objectives’ are concerned with broader international considerations, relating 
either to the structure of the international system as a whole, or to some parts 
of it. These three categories do not mutually exclusive, but can coexist and 
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Another way to look at sanctions is to record the number of states 
involved. Most of the times the initiative in imposing 
international sanctions rests on one government. Indeed 
they can be both unilateral and multilateral. In the first 
case, sanctions are imposed by only one country against 
a target country. In the second case, sanctions are 
imposed by more than one country. On one hand, it is 
possible that other countries follow a ‘promoter’ country. 
Otherwise, the choice of an economic punishment can be adopted within the 
framework of an international organisation. 
Looking at the object of sanctions, we can distinguish three main kinds of 
sanctions: boycotts, embargoes and financial sanctions. A boycott is a 
restriction of imports of one or more goods from the target country. It takes 
place to lower the demand for certain products from the target country. 
Moreover, it attempts to reduce the target’s foreign exchange earnings and 
therefore its ability to purchase goods. It also aims at inducing a damage to a 
particular industry or sector of the target country. They are usually criticised 
as ineffective because target countries are able to find alternative markets or 
arrange triangular purchases to circumvent import controls. Otherwise, an 
embargo restricts exports of certain products to the target country. This is the 
most common technique. The prohibition on exports may be partial or 
complete. It is usually enforced by a system of export licenses and supporting 
measures. Finally, financial sanctions restrict or suspend lending and investing 
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into target economy. They also impose additional restrictions on international 
payments in order to prevent sanctions-busting. Moreover foreign assets of the 
target economy may be frozen.  
 
EFFECTIVENESS AND COSTS 
Negative sanctions are generally studied in relation to their effectiveness. 
Many scholars have devoted their efforts to distinguishing characteristics of 
degrees of success and failure of the economic punishment.1 However, the 
efficacy of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy is still in great doubt. 
Needless to say, no argument on effectiveness can be expounded without 
taking into account the costs. The common rationale behind the imposition of 
these measures is that the higher the costs for the target countries, the higher 
the probability that their government behaviour could be affected by welfare 
losses. Boycotts and embargoes, for instance, should deprive the target country 
of some of the gains of trade and therefore lead to a lower welfare. The costs 
for target countries are commonly assumed to be positively related with the 
degree of integration with the sender country. The more the economies are 
integrated, the more the economic interactions should be affected. On the other 
hand, the sender country could also be affected by imposing sanctions. In fact, 
commercial and financial linkages with target country agents are threatened, 
suspended or blocked. 
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1 For examples of studies on the effectiveness of sanctions see among others Baldwin (1985), 
Hufbauer et al. (1990), Martin (1992), Van Bergeijk (1994,1995), Pape (1997), Bonetti (1998), 
Drezner (2000), Mastanduno (2001). Therefore, the first impact we can evaluate is the impact on trade. 
Sanctions depress trade but, as other quantitative restrictions, they are 
characterised by a phenomenon of rent-seeking. Suppose 
now that a sender country imposes an export embargo on 
exports to the target country, restricting them. Since the 
embargo restricts supply, it also raises import prices in the 
importing country. A wedge between the international 
market price and the domestic price will reflect the 
quantitative restriction. A rent that can be distributed either to the government 
or to the private agents will appear. For simplicity of analysis we can stress 
that since an embargo is enforced trough a system of licenses, it is 
operationally indistinguishable from a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) and 
includes a rent that either pertains to the foreign exporters or is taken over by 
the government. In fact, the rent could be captured by the sender country’s 
government if exporting licenses were competitively auctioned off for their 
premium value. Otherwise, the free issuing of licenses would transfer the rent 
to exporters who managed to obtain them. Exporters are likely to collude in 
order to capture the monopoly rents created by the imposition of the quota. At 
the same time an important implication is that the supply restriction requires 
state-sponsored collusive activity with cartel discipline maintained by the 
administrative powers of the government. 
Moreover, the shortfall in supply caused by the embargo could also 
benefit exporters not involved in the conflict between sender and target 
country. Third countries producers, in fact, could allow non-restraining 
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is on trade exporters to increase deliveries to the importing country expanding their 
market share. However, like in any other trade restriction, the greatest burden 
is imposed on the consumers of the importing country, i.e. the target country. 
In fact they must pay a higher domestic price for the good that results from its 
scarcity premium.  
Another main feature is the focus on the behaviour of third countries. In 
case of multilateral sanctions, it is often argued that the economic punishment 
should be more effective, since more countries are involved in a co-operative 
and coercive behaviour. Whenever sanctions are unilaterally imposed, the 
impact could be questionable. On one hand, third countries agents, both public 
and private, may capture the gains of diverted trade. On the other hand, the 
expected negative effects of sanctions could spill-over to third countries.  
An argument that is often remarked analysing the sanctions is the 
possibility that the sender country should face a phenomenon of trade 
diversion. It has been argued that sanctions-busting is always likely to occur. 
Sanctions are able to create powerful incentives for evasion. Trade can be 
diverted trough new ingenious relationships devised by domestic and third-
country firms. Particularly Drezner (2000) distinguishes if the sender country 
is unable to enforce the application of sanctions due to defections by private 
rent-seeking actors (sanctions-busting) or by nation-states (backsliding). This 
phenomenon is often indicated as one of the main reasons of failure of the 
economic punishment. Take Nicaragua in 80s under the Sandinista 
government. After the United States, under the Reagan administration, 
imposed sanctions on it, other western countries disagreed with American 
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foreign trade office to Toronto, stating that it had ‘a perfect right’ to sell 
Nicaragua anything it wants to buy. This is the rationale that very often led to 
diplomatic efforts for multilateral co-operation in sanctions enforcing. It is also 
behind the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran/Libya Sanctions Act, which 
threatens to punish third-country corporations that conduct business in Cuba, 
Iran, and Libya. Therefore, according to this point of view it could be argued 
that U.S. competitors trade with U.S.-targeted countries capturing the business 
when the United States imposes unilateral sanctions. 
A different argument is expounded by Van Bergeijk (1995). He points out 
that, after sanctions have been imposed, changes in the world economic 
system occur. These changes also influence the economic opportunities of 
countries that are in no way involved in the conflict. These are the ‘network 
effects’ of sanctions. In many cases the impact of boycotts and embargoes does 
spill-over to trade partners (and to trade partners’ trade partners and so on). 
Therefore, other countries will suffer from the trade disruption caused by 
sanctions. It would appear obvious that these arguments could be stressed if 
sanctions are unilaterally imposed. When sanctions are multilateral, what it 
would be expected is that the trade disruption phenomenon occurs at least for 
all countries involved in. In a recent research work (Caruso, 2003), I have   
analysed the effects of sanctions on G-7 countries other than the United States. 
Since these are supposed to have a similar exporting capability to the United 
States, the effects on bilateral trade flows of industrialised countries with 
target countries were assumed to proxy the impact of the U.S. sanctions on 
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countries is diversified. Limited and moderate sanctions show a slightly 
positive impact. Roughly, other G-7 countries increase their bilateral trade 
with U.S. sanctions-targeted countries. Thus, it seems that sanctions-busting 
works. On the other hand, comprehensive and extensive sanctions induce a 
disruption of trade for other countries too. In such a case, the network negative 
effects impact on other countries’ trade. The estimated negative effect is very 
large. A negative effect is also obviously recorded when sanctions are 
multilateral.  
Hufbauer et al. (2003) divided sanctions into three categories: limited, 
moderated and extensive. They considered minor financial, export, cultural, or 
travel sanctions to be "limited". Examples include 
suspending or reducing bilateral aid, and imposing 
export restrictions on weapons or narrow categories of 
dual-use technologies. Broader trade or financial 
sanctions were classified as "moderate". The "extensive" 
category is reserved for comprehensive trade and 
financial sanctions such as those against Iraq or Serbia. 
Sometimes, however, a combination of several "moderate" sanctions, such as 
U.S. export controls against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the 
Cold War, together with denial of MFN status under the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment, were considered "extensive". As expected, extensive sanctions 
show a large depressing effect on bilateral trade flows. Otherwise the 




on the utility of 
negative sanctions 
is still open 
28 
Raul Caruso  statistically significant. Moreover, they find little evidence to support the 
argument that sanctions continue to suppress trade after they have been lifted.  
Another recent empirical analysis is the one presented by Askari et al. 
(2003). They measure the economic impact on the United States, some selected 
major target countries, and some third countries – the European Union and 
Japan. They also employ an augmented gravity model including dummy 
variables to investigate the impact of sanctions on trade. In this study, they 
intend to focus on the determinants of the U.S. trade flows (exports, imports, 
as well as total trade. Specifically, they use 19 years (1980-1998) of annual data 
for the U.S. exports, imports, and bilateral trade. Their findings show that the 
impact of U.S. economic sanctions on U.S. trade (bilateral trade, exports alone, 
or imports alone) is very sensitive to how the sanctioned country list is 
identified and selected. This is particularly true for countries specified as 
targets of U.S. selective economic sanctions. 
For the three different classifications they have used, two of them show 
no consistent statistical significance. Using a sample that includes the formerly 
planned economies that have been for a long time the target of U.S. economic 
sanctions in recent history, they have found that sanctions have a significant 
impact on U.S. exports, imports, and total trade. Furthermore, comprehensive 
economic sanctions have a significant negative impact on U.S. bilateral trade, 
exports, and imports with target countries subject to these sanctions. They also 
investigated whether the sanctions-busting  argument should be confirmed. 
They call it ‘third country effect’. For the group of formerly planned 
economies, their trade (including bilateral trade, exports alone, and imports 
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sanctions as their trade with the U.S. On the other hand, in the case of 
countries subject to comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., 
there is no significant impact on these countries’ trade with the E.U. or Japan. 
In some cases, they found that these sanctions have actually promoted trade 
between these countries and the E.U. or Japan. They interpret this as a clear 
indication of sanctions-busting or (as in their words) third-country effect. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article simply underlined some aspects related to the costs of 
sanctions, in particular, with respect to the impact on 
international trade. Sanctions depress people welfare by 
depressing trade. In fact, when trade is blocked people 
suffer, simple to say, for lack of goods and services. 
Experience shows that sanctions affect the target 
country population more than the target regime. Take 
Iraq. The sanctions imposed in 1991 did not affect 
Saddam Hussein regime at all, but inflicted a heavy 
burden on people. Something similar happened in Cuba, Iran, and former 
Yugoslavia. This is also the rationale behind the debate, within the UN 
organisation, on ‘smart sanctions’. Sender country firms also suffer from trade 
disruption. Moreover, analysing trade flows we can verify that without a 
strong international co-operation trade is diverted through third countries. 
People welfare is affected in such a case too. Rent gains flourish for a small 
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order percentage of businessmen and government officials. In the gravest cases the 
impact of boycotts and embargoes does spill-over to the trade partners (and to 
the trade partners’ trade partners and so on). These are the negative ‘network 
effects’ of sanctions. So, why sanctions? It should not be forgotten that 
sanctions are also an alternative to other instruments of conflict resolution. 
Would a war be less costly than sanctions? The answer appears to be negative. 
Signalling political hostility, avoiding the use of force, by means of sanctions is 
still the rationale behind the imposing of them.  
But this was just a part of the story. What about the impact of positive 
sanctions? Should we set the market free? Should we allow the silent remedy 
of economic integration work? Could the liberal idea of peaceful spill-over of 
trade work? No doubt. This is a many millions dollars question. Classical 
Liberals believed that free trade meant more than just a more plentiful supply 
of goods and services. They also were confident that with freedom of trade a 
world of peace and international tranquillity would come. After World War II,  
economic integration in Europe allowed to build up a common basis to avoid 
bloody and never-ending struggles. The same happened with Japan. The 
system created after  World War II had free trade as a founding pillar. In the 
aftermath of a war, the debate between negative and positive sanctions, 
between free trade and protectionism, should flourish. Sanctions are just a 
little part of this debate, but what happened and is happening in Iraq, Iran, 
Cuba (to quote the most famous scenarios) should foster a greater attention to 
the economic side of international order. 
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